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I. INTRODUCTION: RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
What is American constitutional law? A traditional, and widely ac-
cepted' response to this seemingly naive question looks to the seven articles
of the original U.S. Constitution, its twenty-seven amendments,2 and the
enormous body of decisions by the judiciary--especially the Supreme
Court-scrutinizing and applying these provisions.
Increasingly, however, this account is being reexamined. A growing
body of legal and political science scholars are questioning the descriptive
accuracy (and normative appeal) of a picture of constitutional law premised
on the legal opinions of judges. In opposition to judicial supremacy (the
doctrine holding that the courts retain the final and most important word on
constitutional questions) many of these scholars invoke the notion of con-
stitutional supremacy. Under this conception, the constitutional aspiration
B.A. Wesleyan University, 1991; Ph.D. Candidate in Government, University of Texas at Aus-
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I See, e.g., JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 102 (1984)
(noting that "the common public and academic opinion of judicial power today firmly supports a rather
simple doctrine of judicial finality, a notion that the Court is, in brief, the last word in constitutional
government"); Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution,
24 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 359, 362 (1997) (describing "[the prevailing view.., that the Supreme
Court-and the 'lower' federal courts-interprets the Constitution and decides its meaning").
2 While some commentators treat the legal status of the Twenty-seventh Amendment as unprob-
lematic, a number of scholars have pointed out that its unique ratification history poses considerable
theoretical and practical difficulties in determining whether it is part of the U.S. Constitution. The
Twenty-seventh Amendment was originally drafted in 1789 (as a proposed "Second Amendment"), but
did not receive the requisite number of state ratification votes until 1992. While the Twenty-seventh
Amendment did not specify a particular deadline for ratification, there still is some question whether an
amendment can be properly ratified over 203 years and by so many different generations. See generally
Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported Twenty-Seventh Amendment, II
CONST. COMMENTARY 101 (1994).
3 See SOTRIOs A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 179 (1984) (discussing "con-
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to bind the entire polity to a set of commands and values implies a recipro-
cal responsibility by citizens and politicians to comprehend and even apply
the Constitution on their own; we must look not just to the courts and
judges, but to a whole set of politically coordinate institutions and indi-
viduals in order to ascertain constitutional meaning."
In Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts,' Mark Tushnet offers
one of the more recent entries into this important and lively debate, and one
of the more sharply drawn contrasts to the traditional, court-centered ap-
proach to American constitutional law. Tushnet argues that judicial con-
stitutional interpretation fails to give full expression to our most cherished
political commitments, and he proposes that the courts discontinue exam-
ining constitutional questions, thereby ending both judicial supremacy and
"judicial review"-the practice through which courts invalidate laws (and
other political initiatives and procedures) on the grounds that they are un-
constitutional.7 Instead, he calls for a "populist" form of constitutional in-
terpretation, in which political leaders and the citizenry draw upon and
validate the Constitution's "fundamental guarantees," not the constitu-
tional text generally!
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts provides an incisive cri-
stitutional aspirations").
4 "Coordinate construction" is but one of many names that scholars have used to describe consti-
tutional interpretation by nonjudicial institutions and individuals. For a sample of the literature exam-
ining this topic see SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSmTrLmONAL AUrHORITY: TUE ABO'mON
AND WAR POWERS DEBATES (1992); JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESs (1980); NEAL DEviNs, SHAPING CONSTFUTIONAL VALUES (1996); LoutS FISHER.
CONSTTUTIONAL DIALOGuES (1988); GARY JACOBSOHN, SUPREME COURT AND TItE DECLINE OF
CONSTrrUTIONAL ASPIRATION (1986); SANFORD LEVsoN, CONsTrrutiONAL FArin (1988); KErrH E.
WHfrEINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Etrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L REV. 1359 (1997); Frank IL Easterbrook.
Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L REV. 905 (1990); Christopher L Eisgrber, The lost Com-
petent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEo. LJ. 347 (1994); Louis Fisher, Constitu-
tional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L Rev. 707 (1985); Gant. supra note I; Eugene
W. Hickok, Jr., The Framer's Understanding of Constitutional Deliberations in Congress. 21 GA. L
REV. 217 (1986); Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? he Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional
Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401 (1986); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Execu-
tive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. LJ. 217 (1994).
5 MARK TUsHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
6 Identifying the "court-centered approach" as American is not meant to imply that judicial review
or judicial supremacy are unique to the United States. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi. Thayer's Clear
Mistake, 88 Nw. U. L REV. 269 (discussing a "global trend" toward "written, judicially-enforced con-
stitutions"). Nevertheless, the degree to which U.S. courts, and especially the Supreme Court. have
parlayed the practice of judicial review into institutional power does seem exceptional. See, e.g..
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPRENE COURT 221 (Sanford Levinson rev., 2d ed. 1994)
("The Supreme Court of the United States undoubtedly remains the most powerful court of any in the
world....').
7 While often conflated in scholars' minds, judicial review and judicial supremacy am logically
distinct. One might recognize the authority of courts to declare legislation (and executive action) as
unconstitutional without conceding their supreme interpretive power. See, e.g., Cant. supra note 1, at
368 ("Mhe concept of judicial review is not synonymous with the concept of judicial supremacy.").
For a very different argument that also seems to draw a distinction between judicial review and judicial
supremacy see Paulsen, supra note 4.
9 See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 11.
Apr. 2000]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
tique of our contemporary practices of constitutional interpretation and
sketches a bold, imaginatively conceived alternative. Tushnet's articula-
tion and defense of populist constitutional law should receive attention
from a number of different audiences, including critics of the contemporary
courts, those interested in nonjudicial interpretation of the Constitution, and
constitutional theorists.
Notwithstanding the considerable power of Tushnet's criticisms of ju-
dicial supremacy and judicial review, and the attractiveness of his vision of
constitutionalism, there are a number of ways in which his arguments
against judicial constitutional interpretation are overstated and his own ac-
count is incomplete. As this essay will suggest, it is both possible and de-
sirable to reconfigure American constitutional law without abandoning the
bulk of the constitutional text or the distinctive contributions of our courts.
In building this case, I examine what appear to be the two primary compo-
nents of Tushnet's argument for populist constitutional law: his discussion
of the political values that American constitutional law should honor, and
his suggestion that constitutional interpretation be taken away from the ju-
diciary and ceded to the people and their political leaders.
II. THE THIN AND THICK CONSTITUTIONS
Tushnet urges us to base our constitutional law on the "thin Constitu-
tion" 9 -the Constitution's "fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of
expression, and liberty" '0-and not the aggregated provisions and clauses
of our entire constitutional text." This thin Constitution, best captured by
the "the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitu-
tion's Preamble," ' should be promoted because it is both morally compel-
ling and essential to our self-understanding: it provides a prescriptive vi-
sion for America and an account of our most significant political values.
Tushnet declares that "[wie ought to take as our project realizing the Dec-
laration's principles because, in the end, those principles are good ones," "
while also insisting that "historically the American people have been
committed to [the principles of the thin Constitution], at least as aspira-
tions." " The thin Constitution, Tushnet believes, draws from the best parts
of our political traditions."
The thin Constitution is "thin" in the sense that it is not terribly restric-
tive; its precepts can have different expressions and can be applied in a va-
9 Id. at 11.
10 Id.
11 Id.
:2 Id. at 181 (citations omitted).
'3 Id. at 193.
14 Id2 at 127; see also id. at 181 (stating that the thin Constitution "deals with the values that ought
to animate our public life" and "[tihe idea of universal human rights resonates powerfully with the
historical experience of the people of the United States").Is See id. at 193 (contrasting the thin Constitution with the American tradition of "nativism"); see
also id at 174 (describing the thin Constitution as comprising "the best in us").
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riety of ways. Focusing on the thin Constitution "does not determine the
outcomes of [particular] political controversies or dictate much about pub-
lic policy. Instead, it orients us as we think about and discuss where our
country ought to go." 6 Thus, both proponents of affirmative action as well
as advocates of a "color-blind" Constitution can uphold the values of the
thin Constitution provided their arguments are rooted in its promise of
equality and universal human rights. Furthermore, we can be committed to
the precepts of the thin Constitution and still "constitute ourselves either as
fractious or pacific, contentious or civil.. . ." '"
How should we understand the rest of the Constitution--the numerous
particular provisions and clauses that form the body of the constitutional
text and serve as the basis for traditional conceptions of constitutional law?
Most of the Constitution, according to Tushnet, consists of the "thick"
Constitution, "detailed provisions describing how the government is to be
organized." ' The thick Constitution exists merely to support and frame the
essence of our constitutional order, the principles expressed in the Pream-
ble and Declaration (i.e., the thin Constitution).
While the notion is not fully developed, Tushnet suggests that in addi-
tion to the thick Constitution, there are a number of "important" constitu-
tional provisions that seem to give direct expression to the thin Constitu-
tion--the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, for example.' 9 Despite the greater significance of
these specific constitutional provisions relative to the thick Constitution as
a whole, Tushnet urges us to remain focused on the general guarantees of
the thin Constitution lest we mistakenly think "that the thin Constitution
consists of, or is the same as, what the Supreme Court has said about [these
'important' constitutional] provisions." 7"
Tushnet's discussion of the relationship between the thin and thick
Constitutions gives rise to an important question. Can we ignore the con-
stitutional text-at least its less important components-in the service of
the thin Constitution? Tushnet concludes that we can.2' He notes, how-
ever, that we might hesitate in violating specific provisions of the Consti-
tution out of a belief that they represent valuable rules or principles on their
own, even if they do not necessarily advance the fundamental commitments
of the thin Constitution:
[p]erhaps the specific provisions function as default rules written by particu-
larly intelligent people, and so ought to be followed unless it seems worth ex-
,6 Id at 194.
17 Id at 186.
Id at 9.
"Id. at 11.
0 IL We might turn away from even important specific constitutional provisions for another rea-
son. Even when these provisions appear to be based on the commitments of the thin Constitution. they
ae, at best, derivative and auxiliary. They can and should be abandoned if a different manifestation of
the thin Constitution better secures our "fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of expression.
and liberty." Id
21 See generally id. at ch. 2 ("Doing Constitutional Law Outside the Courts").
Apr. 2000]
JOURNJAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
pending the political energy to displace those rules, in circumstances where, on
reflection, the default rules appear to obstruct the promotion of the general wel-
fare.2
But even if one were to accept this argument for preserving particular
clauses of the Constitution, it would not seem to impose terribly stringent
legal obligations, especially when measured against traditional under-
standings of the binding quality of our supreme law. Conceiving of our
constitutional text as a series of "default rules" means only that we cannot
treat these specific provisions capriciously; we might nevertheless ignore
them when we have good reasons to do so, and we surely should ignore
them, according to Tushnet, when doing so would promote the thin Con-
stitution.'
We can imagine a quite different argument for adhering to specific con-
stitutional provisions even when they seem to be in tension with the com-
mitments of the thin Constitution: perhaps we should embrace these provi-
sions because they form an integral part of our self-understanding. While
we might have cause to abandon particular provisions of the constitutional
text, doing so could "threaten our national identity" if the thick Constitu-
tion contributes to our constitution as a people.24 Tushnet, however, rejects
this suggestion: "we are constituted as a people by the thin Constitution,
not the thick one." 25 We can reject specific constitutional provisions in or-
der to advance the thin Constitution without fear of compromising our
common political culture."
I. DEFENDING CONSTITUTIONAL THICKNESS
Tushnet's argument for a system of constitutional law based strictly on
the thin Constitution might strike a reader as strange, and even troubling,
for several reasons. To begin with, as an argument about what our consti-
tutionalism should be, Tushnet's account seems incomplete. Tushnet de-
scribes the thin Constitution as embodying "the material out of which
Fourth of July speeches are fashioned," that is, the principles culled from
2 Id. at 52.
23 See id. at 51-52 (defending a hypothetical Senator who ignores the Constitution's "Emoluments
Clause" in order to promote the thin Constitution). Of course, even the traditional judicial understand-
ing of constitutional law allows for specific textual provisions to be seemingly ignored in some circum-
stances. Consider, for example, that if the state can identify a "compelling interest" it can escape or at
least attenuate the commands of particular constitutional clauses. Thus, despite the First Amendment's
specification that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech," the Supreme
Court has upheld federal and state legislation that restricts speech interests. U.S. CONST. amend. I (em-
phasis added).
24 TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 192.
Id. at 50; see also id. at 12 (" Mhe people are unconcerned about the thick Constitution").
While Tushnet does not make the argument, it is possible to claim that what he alludes to as the
"important" specific provisions of the Constitution shape our national identity even if the specific pro-
visions of the thick Constitution generally do not. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20. It is diffi-
cult, however, to identify what provisions these would be (perhaps the First Amendment)? In any
event, it seems somewhat unlikely that these provisions would shape our national identity more power-
fully than the general precepts of the thin Constitution.
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the Preamble and Declaration.2 But while the values celebrated in these
speeches may point us toward our polity's most compelling ideals, they do
not exhaust our preeminent constitutional concerns. Our Constitution
surely includes commitments that reflect not our nation's most honorable
impulses and ideals, but our deepest seated anxieties about political be-
havior. These latter commitments, while important, are unlikely to be hon-
ored in Fourth of July speeches. In other words, Tushnet's thin Constitu-
tion does not appear to encompass a major component of our
constitutionalism-a preoccupation with the dangers posed by human falli-
bility.
Much of our Constitution's text and structure is based on a set of politi-
cal judgments about human nature and its corruptibility, and the ways in
which individual passion and self-interest can work against the public
good." If we accept that our constitutional law ought to recognize and ac-
count for these failings of human nature, numerous aspects of the thick
Constitution-bicameralism, fixed elections, federalism, the constitutional
amendment process-take on a renewed importance, and provide a basis
for challenging Tushnet's evaluation of the thick Constitution and its con-
tributions to our polity. Various constitutional provisions establishing rep-
resentative government (intended to refine and enlarge public views that
are often led by passion rather than reason),7 the Constitution's separation
of powers system (a network of countervailing powers and institutions ar-
ranged to channel potentially destructive individual ambition in ways that
promote the public good), and procedural checks designed to slow the
potentially tempestuous course of political change,3' are all central to the
normative argument for our constitutional order, and yet peripheral to (and
perhaps even at odds with) Tushnet's vision of constitutionalism. An ex-
ample drawn from history will help demonstrate the implications of Tush-
net's reliance on the thin Constitution (and inattention to the thick Consti-
tution) as the basis for constitutional law.
In the summer of 1864, as civil war casualties mounted and end-the-war
agitation increased, it seemed a genuine possibility that Democrat George
McClellan, and not Abraham Lincoln, would be elected President. A
McClellan victory would have likely preserved some form of southern in-
dependence and the continued enslavement of over 4 million African-
TuSHNEr, supra note 5, at 12.
28 Some of the Constitution's safeguards against corruption owe their origins to what historians
have described as a "whiggish" theory of rights and representation popular at the time of the American
Revolution. See SAMUEL L BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMEIlCAN
FEDERALISM (1993).
See THE FEDERAJsT No. 10 (James Madison).
See THE FEDERALUST No. 51 (James Madison). But see Theodore J. Lowi, Constitutional Mery-
Go-Round: The First Tine Tragedy the Second Time Farce, in CONSTIT'LTIONAL STUPIDITIES.
CoNsTrTUTONAL TRAGEDIES 189 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds.. 1998) (associat-
ing a number of political vices with the separation of powers system).
3See Charles M. Hardin, The Separation of Powers Needs Major Revision, in SEPARATION OF
PowERS-DoES IT STI.L WORK? 90, 101-06 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1936) (dis-
cussing the arguments of James Q. Wilson on the advantages of incremental change).
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Americans. 32 Would Lincoln have been constitutionally justified in post-
poning the presidential election until after the war?33 Presumably, Tush-
net's response would be a fairly unproblematic "yes": despite the moral
inadequacies of Lincoln's position on slavery, the thin Constitution's fun-
damental guarantees would surely have been advanced by Lincoln's leader-
ship and degraded by a McClellan presidency.3
For most people, however, a decision by Lincoln--or a contemporary
President facing similarly difficult choices-to ignore specific constitu-
tional provisions setting the length of presidential service and the mecha-
nisms for election would be troubling. Fixed and stable governing proce-
dures, including the electoral process, form a critical part of the
Constitution's protection against political tyranny and even in the face of
exigency, we should be reluctant to violate these procedures.3' But Tush-
net's vision of constitutional law gives such overriding weight to the values
of the thin Constitution that the procedural protections of the thick Consti-
tution against human fallibility threaten to be rendered nugatory.36
32 See DAvID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN ch. 19 (1995) ("I Am Pretty Sure-Footed").
33 I have included the proviso, "after the war," to head off the objection that Lincoln's hypothetical
move would have unacceptably impinged upon the thin Constitution's commitment to democratic rule.While the ultimate likelihood of Northern victory seemed fairly secure by 1864 (especially in
light of the outcomes at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in the summer of 1863), it is not difficult (given the
hard-fought nature of these battles and the frequent ineptitude of Union military leadership) to construct
alternate scenarios in which Lincoln would have been even harder pressed politically (and therefore,
perhaps, even more tempted to suspend the 1864 election). Lincoln himself despaired as late as August
that the election would be lost. See Abraham Lincoln, Memorandum on Probable Failure of Re-election
(August 23, 1864), in 1 ABRAHAM LINcoLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 624 (Don E.
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
35 Which does not mean, of course, that it would never be appropriate to violate "fixed and stable
governing procedures" in the service of other constitutional ends. See supra note 23 and accompanying
text (observing that even the "traditional" approach to constitutional law allows for some flexibility
and pragmatism in applying the constitutional text); Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special
Session (July 4, 1861), in 2 ABRAHAM LNCoLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 246-61 (Don
E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (defending, among other things, his decision to suspend the writ of habeas
corus).
In addition to being suggested by the Lincoln example, this outcome becomes apparent in trying
to construct a theory of constitutional change consistent with Tushnet's thin Constitution. Notwith-
standing Article V (which delineates the Constitution's formal amendment procedures), Tushnet would,
presumably, sanction amendment of the Constitution through any number of means so long as the
change promoted the thin Constitution. After all, the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified under extraordi-
nary and coercive conditions and outside of the strict legal parameters of Article V, is still a legitimate,
legally binding alteration of the preexisting political order. See, e.g., I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). See generally RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION (Sanford Levinson ed.,
1995).
While Ackerman has delineated a relatively identifiable (and historically unusual) set of circum-
stances under which a non-Article V amendment can take place, Tushnet seems to have no such restric-
tions. Thus, in addition to supporting the Fourteenth Amendment, Tushnet is committed to even more
legally controversial alterations of the thick Constitution, provided these changes support the thin Con-
stitution's "fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of expression, and liberty." TUSHNEr, supra
note 5, at 11. Under Tushnet's theory, would not Woodrow Wilson have been justified in using mili-
tary occupation to facilitate passage of the Nineteenth Amendment (extending suffrage to women)?
And what, if any, constitutional restrictions would prevent contemporary political leaders from using
Reconstruction-era tactics to ensure ratification of a new (and perhaps more expansive) Equal Rights
Amendment designed to advance the thin Constitution? These examples point to some troubling impli-
[Vol. 2:3
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Tushnet's account of the thick and thin Constitutions suffers from a de-
scriptive oversight in addition to its normative shortcomings. Tushnet ar-
gues not only that the thin Constitution captures what our fundamental
commitments should be, but also that it represents the most significant val-
ues constituting our national political community.' But some aspects of
the thick Constitution are essential to our self-understanding. While Tush-
net argues that we would be unlikely to go to war to preserve the presi-
dent's "right to require opinions in writing from cabinet members," the
nation did go to war (with itself) at least in part over questions about state
power and the nature of American federalism.-"
IV. TAKING THE CONSTITTON AWAY FROM THE CouRTs
In addition to arguing that our constitutional law should be based on re-
deeming the values of the thin Constitution, Tushnet contends that political
leaders and the populace, rather than the courts, should interpret the Con-
stitution:
[D]isagreements over the thin Constitution's meaning are best conducted by the
people, in the ordinary venues for political discussion. Discussions among the
people are not discussion by the people alone, however. Politics does not occur
without politicians, and political leaders play an important role in the account
of populist constitutional law I develop here.9
Tushnet calls for taking the Constitution away from the courts (and bring-
ing an end to judicial supremacy) by phasing out judicial reviewL In sup-
porting this proposal, he points to a number of problems associated with
judicial review and judicial supremacy, while also anticipating and con-
fronting likely objections to his altemative-a system of constitutional in-
terpretation carried out by the people acting in traditional political forums.
Tushnet concedes that achieving his proposal will be difficult: the
Court's role as authoritative interpreter of the Constitution appears to be
cations of Tushnet's willingness to abandon the thick Constitution and embrace a theory of thin consti-
tutionalism.
See TusHNEr, supra note 5, at 12,50.
3s I. at 11. Many aspects of the thick Constitution are duplicated in state constitutions, further sug-
gesting that these elements may comprise a part of our national political culture. See Moms P.
FIORINA & PAUL E. PErERSON, THE NEv AME,1CAN DEMOCRACY 92 (1998) (noting that every state
has adopted some form of separation of powers governance, and every state except Nebraska provides
for a two-house legislature in its constitution).
TuSHNET, supra note 5, at 14 (emphasis in original).
"a See supra note 7 and accompanying text (distinguishing judicial review and judicial supremncy).
For classical defenses of judicial review, see generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Crantia) 137
(1803), and Ti FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). For recent defenses of judicial supremacy,
see Alexander & Schauer, supra note 4, and Gant, supra note 1.
It is not entirely clear whether Tushnet is committed to ending judicial supremacy, judicial re-
view, or judicial interpretation of the Constitution more generally. As noted earlier. judicial supremacy
and judicial review are not synonymous, and even if both practices were discontinued, the courts might
still offer (non-binding) interpretations of the Constitution. See. e.g., Paulsen, supra note 4. For pur-
poses of simplicity, I generally assume Tushnet is criticizing both judicial review and judicial suprem-
acy, unless his arguments suggest otherwise.
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widely accepted throughout our political order.4' Nevertheless, he believes
that an especially "talented" political leader could make the failings of
both judicial review and judicial supremacy widely apparent, and conse-
quently initiate a transformation of our constitutional self-understanding by"appealing to the best in us, the tradition linked to the thin Constitution in
which we take an active role in constructing our constitutional rights with-
out relying on the courts to save us from ourselves."42
While Tushnet's thin Constitution is largely a novel invention, his sug-
gestion that constitutional interpretation be pried from the hands of the ju-
diciary is not.43  Nevertheless, Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts makes an innovative contribution to the burgeoning debate on con-
stitutional interpretation by nonjudicial actors. Tushnet systematically and
subtly examines several questions that previous scholars have engaged only
in piecemeal fashion, if at all: What is to be gained by "distribut[ing] con-
stitutional responsibility throughout the population?" 4 What are the politi-
cal and legal implications of such a move?
Tushnet begins addressing these questions by making a case against ju-
dicial supremacy and judicial review. He argues that these practices limit
our understanding of the Constitution's role in our political life.4 To the
extent that the courts are the exclusive interpreters of the Constitution-or
at least retain the power to invalidate legislative and executive action-
politicians and citizens are likely to be constrained by the judiciary's vision
of constitutionalism. 6 For Tushnet, this is primarily troubling because the
courts have given insufficient expression to the thin Constitution. "[W]hat
the courts say about the Constitution is specialized and driven at times by
[their] special institutional concerns" 47 with the result that court decisions"may be more qualified than we should like."'' 4 The complex categories,
classifications, and doctrines the judiciary uses to develop its understand-
ings of constitutional meaning "are not what ordinary citizens need to re-
cite when we try to figure out what [the thin Constitution] requires."49
According to Tushnet, judicial supremacy and judicial review are
problematic for another reason. Even when the courts issue decisions that
ostensibly advance the thin Constitution, these decisions are unlikely to
4' See TususEr, supra note 5, at 174 ("[Vligorous judicial review is [currently] part of our self-
constitution.")
42 Id.
43 See generally sources cited supra note 4. Cf. RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE, THE PEOPLE RuLE 115
(1994) (concluding that "there is no constitutionalism" distinguishable from the choices of the people).
44 TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 174.
45 See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 168 ("The lessons people learn about equality from Supreme
Court decisions... and the lessons they learn about free speech... may be more qualified than...
[theZ] like.").
But see Gant, supra note 1, at 392-96 (arguing that even judicial supremacy need not foreclose
constitutional interpretation by nonjudicial actors).
47 TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 168.
48 Id.40la
49 Id. at 11. Indeed, the judiciary's legal and technical language makes their interpretation of the
Constitution often inscrutable to the public.
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have much of an effect. Tushnet's examination of "the historical record
and considerations of constitutional theory and structure suggest[s] that ju-
dicial review does not make much difference one way or the other" with
respect to making significant social changes or protecting the liberties of
the American people." As numerous scholars have illustrated, the courts'
decisions can be shaped and their influence limited through an array of po-
litical forces.5' As a result, Tushnet concludes "that judicial review is
likely simply to reinforce whatever a political movement can get outside
the courts."52 Efforts to achieve particular constitutional outcomes by fo-
cusing on the courts are largely misguided.
Turning the Constitution over to the people by embracing populist con-
stitutional law would allow the nation as a whole to give its own, effective
expression to the thin Constitution, and not simply echo the courts' legal-
isms. But what, if anything, might be lost with such an approach? One of
the most prominent criticisms leveled against those seeking to broaden the
role of nonjudicial actors in constitutional interpretation is that such a move
would induce instability and even chaos into our legal system, and ulti-
mately the political order as a whole." As Tushnet points out, however, the
courts have not always produced enduring legal norms, and there is nothing
in principle prohibiting political leaders (working with their constituents)
from producing constitutional understandings that are at least as stable!"
After all, the courts have frequently demonstrated a willingness to overturn
important precedents, while the executive and legislative branches do not
regularly induce policy upheavals even after the most contentious political
debates.
55
But perhaps it is wise to refrain from "taking the Constitution away
from the courts" because of the institutional incapacity of Congress and the
President to interpret the Constitution responsibly. Don't the political in-
sulation, professional training, and institutional norms of the courts suggest
that they are best qualified to provide principled and reasoned interpreta-
tions of the nation's most important legal document? Tushnet thinks oth-
ervise. There are certainly episodes of deficient, not to mention politically
motivated,' judicial decisionmaking, and overall "courts actually have not
50 Id. at 154. See generally id. at cl. 6 ("Assessing Judicial Review").
51 For a small sample of the literature examining this point, see DEVINs, supra note 4; FISHER. su-
pra note 4; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOIE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOtrr SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991); Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Polcy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L 279 (1957).
TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 135.
See generally Alexander & Schauer, supra note 4 (arguing that the Supreme Court must be the
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution in order to secure legal stability).
See TUSHNEr, supra note 5, at 28 ("[Court] decisions regularly modify or undermine precedents
in ways that open up new vistas for constitutional transformation. ").
See, e.g., Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instabili. 84 VA. 
L
REV. 83, 106 (1988) (arguing, in contrast to Alexander & Schauer, that coordinate construction 
will
induce "irue stability" not "interpretive anarchy").
The observation that judicial constitutional interpretation has a political dimension is surely not in
itself troubling to Tushnet Tushnet, after all. freely concedes that political considerations inform his
understanding of constitutional law. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at xi (explaining that populist 
consti-
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done such a wonderful job [interpreting the Constitution] as to distinguish
them sharply from legislatures." 17 Moreover, if we accept Tushnet's asser-
tion that the fundamental guarantees of the thin Constitution are the values
that actually constitute our national identity, we should anticipate that the
political leaders and institutions most responsive to the electorate will have
powerful incentives to promote these values.
Tushnet's criticisms of judicial interpretation of the Constitution are
frequently telling: he provides numerous examples of the courts' incon-
sistency, poor record of rights protection, and ineffectiveness in imple-
menting important social and political changes." He also constructs a
strong theoretical case that the courts cannot be relied upon to secure our
fundamental constitutional values (in part due to institutional limitations
such as legal norms), and that we ought to give our political leaders a
greater opportunity to give expression to the thin Constitution. 9
But Tushnet's arguments lead only to the conclusion that our polity is
ill-served by leaving constitutional interpretation solely to the judiciary.
Conceding the necessity of constitutional construction by elected officials,
the shortcomings of strictly legal constitutional analysis, and even the im-
portance of the thin Constitution, does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that the courts cannot contribute to constitutional law. Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts is most effective as a brief against judi-
cial supremacy, rather than as a denunciation of judicial interpretation gen-
erally, or even judicial review. Even if one accepted the core of Tushnet's
case against exclusive or authoritative interpretation by the judiciary, why
couldn't we advance constitutional values by combining some form of ju-
dicial review with constitutional interpretation by political officials-
thereby drawing upon the distinctive perspectives, political strengths, and
constituencies of each institution?
Tushnet's response is that this alternative to his populist constitutional
law "probably will not work." o In order to ensure that constitutional val-
ues would be promoted in a system of shared interpretive responsibility, the
courts would need to intervene when politicians lacked sufficient incentive
to enforce the thin Constitution on their own. Tushnet doubts that judges-
tutional law "is not in the first instance either the expression of pure preferences by [public] officials
and voters or the expression of unfiltered moral judgments. In short, it is not 'mere' politics, nor is it,simply' philosophy"-it is both). But we might well be skeptical about the courts' ability to under-
stand and apply relevant political information to constitutional interpretation, especially compared to
elected officials. See id. at 126.
57 Id. at 129. The problem of determining the relative capacity of politicians vis-a-vis the courts is
complicated by what Tushnet identifies as the "judicial overhang": the pervasive (and distorting) in-fluence of the courts on political actors' understanding of constitutional interpretation. See generally Id.
at 57-65. As Tushnet explains, "[t]he judicial overhang may make the Constitution outside the courts
worse than it might be." Id. at 58.
5s See, e.g., TuSHNmr, supra note 5, at 104-08 (discussing the Court's assessment of the constitu-
tionality of legislative veto).
59 See id& at 12 (discussing the merits of allowing the people to give expression to the thin Constitu-
tion Id. at 125.
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who generally have little political experience and are detached from every-
day "political realities" -would have the capacity to make this assessment
effectively.6' He concludes that the issue of constitutional interpretation is
dichotomous: our constitutional values should be enforced either by the
courts or by politicians."
This determination is hardly inescapable, however. Conceiving of con-
stitutional interpretation as a shared activity, and not the unique responsi-
bility of the courts, does not mean that the courts must still monitor politi-
cians' incentives to protect constitutional values. Alternatively, we can
imagine a system of constitutional interpretation in which each political in-
stitution invokes the Constitution in defending its distinctive responsibili-
ties. In such a system, each branch could assess and even refute its rivals'
constitutional interpretation of specific issues wvithout ultimately evaluating
their interpretive capacities and priorities. This "pluralist" approach to
constitutional interpretation comports with a particular conception of our
separation of power system in which political authority, including interpre-
tive authority, is deliberately dispersed among competing institutions in or-
der to promote the public interest.63 In this view, each branch of govern-
ment has a specialized interpretive role corresponding to its unique
constitutional powers and duties. Courts, which are institutionally and
historically disposed to identifying and protecting rights, would invoke the
Constitution in pursuit of that end, while political actors would simultane-
ously attempt to advance their special functions.'
A recent work by political scientist Keith Whittington suggests the ex-
tent to which constitutional interpretation by the courts can subsist along-
side what he calls "constitutional construction" by elected officials' Us-
ing four case studies to support and illustrate his nuanced constitutional
theory, Whittington identifies a distinctive political approach to "constru-
ing constitutional meaning... [which] elucidate[s] the text in the intersti-
ces of discoverable, interpretive meaning, where the text is so broad or so
underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful but exhaustive reduction to
legal rules."6 Whittington argues not only that judicially-centered legal
analysis of the Constitution can develop concurrently with constitutional
construction by politicians, but that these two forms of constitutional "de-
61 Id. at 126.
6 See id. In addition, it may be difficult to have meaningful nonjudicial interpretation alongside
interpretation by the courts because of the "judicial overhang." See supra note 57 and accompanying
text3This argument builds on an understanding of the Constitution's separation of powers system dc-
scribed in JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987).
64 See Bruce G. Peabody, Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative Sertlement, 
and a
New Agenda for Research, 16 CONST. COMwENTARY 63. 68-72 (1999). Cf Eisgruber. supra note 
4
(offering a different understanding of how we might combine judicial and nonjudicial constitutional
intepretation).
See WHrINGrON, supra note 4, at 3-9 (distinguishing "constitutional constmction" from "con-
stitutional interpretation").
' Id. at5.
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liberation" are in some ways symbiotic.67
V. CONCLUSION: THE MAST AND THE LYRE
One of the more popular analogies in constitutional scholarship draws
from the myth of Ulysses and the Sirens.6s In the course of his journeys,
the hero Ulysses discovers that his ship will pass near the island of the Si-
rens, whose bewitching songs have lured countless prior sailors to leap
from their ships and face certain death, either through drowning, or at the
claws of the monsters themselves. Ulysses, intent upon hearing the Sirens'
songs and surviving the experience, fixes upon an ingenious solution. He
instructs his crew to tie him to one of the ships' masts while his men fill
their ears with wax, allowing him to hear the Sirens' beautiful but deadly
cries while they remain unaffected.
Ulysses' innovation bears some resemblance to the project of constitu-
tionalism. Through constitutions a polity binds itself with (often cumber-
some) commands so that it might preserve a set of values and a way of life
from numerous threats, the most grave being its own weakness." But there
is another myth involving the Sirens, a myth more consonant with the pic-
ture of constitutionalism laid out in Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts. When Jason of Iolcus passes by the island of the Sirens he faces
the same peril as Ulysses. But Jason and his argonauts are saved not by
lashing themselves to the mast and stopping their ears, but by the musician
Orpheus, whose lyre produces such soothing, captivating notes that the he-
roes forget the Sirens' songs and sail to safer waters.
Embedded in the myth of Orpheus and the Sirens is a reminder that
constitutions should not be understood solely as a set of commands that
limit our actions. In order for constitutions to serve as effective and en-
during political projects, they also must capture and give expression to
commitments that the polity perceives as genuinely shared and attractive, if
not preeminent. Constitutions should not simply bind us, they should in-
spire us, pointing us toward morally compelling goals and commitments.
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts provides a powerful re-
minder of the fundamental values at the heart of our constitutional order,
and makes a provocative and impressive case that these values cannot be
sufficiently protected by the courts. In remembering the aspirational com-
ponent of our constitutionalism, however, we should not lose sight of its
6 See U ("The jurisprudential model needs to be supplemented with a more explicitly political one
that describes a distinct effort to understand and rework the meaning of a received constitutional text.");
see also MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTrTIMrONAL
FAILuRE (1998) (discussing the distinctive ways Congress, in the nineteenth century, addressed consti-
tutional issues intrinsic to slavery). For an important earlier effort to distinguish legal and political ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation, see DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1966).
63 See, e.g., JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITIrONS IN CRISIS (1991); Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast:
Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 500
(1997).
69 See FINN, supra note 68, at 3-6.
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constraining functions, and in reflecting on the limitations of judges as con-
stitutional interpreters, we should not dismiss their potential contributions
to constitutionalism's multiple and complex objectives.
